CPLR 4112: Proper Time To Request Jury Poll in a Two-Stage Trial Held To Be at Conclusion of Second Stage by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 3 Volume 44, January 1970, Number 3 Article 30 
December 2012 
CPLR 4112: Proper Time To Request Jury Poll in a Two-Stage Trial 
Held To Be at Conclusion of Second Stage 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1970) "CPLR 4112: Proper Time To Request Jury Poll in a Two-Stage Trial Held To 
Be at Conclusion of Second Stage," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 3 , Article 30. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss3/30 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
must assent before a jury demand can be withdrawn. The majority
found that the provision is meant "to protect the party who in reliance
on his opponent's demand for a jury trial properly fails to make de-
mand in his own note of issue."172
Since a note of issue must be filed in order to place a case on the
court's calendar 1 3 it is usually the plaintiff who files first. In Downing,
however, it was the defendant who did so, and no demand for a jury
trial was included in his note of issue. Plaintiff subsequently demanded
a jury trial, and the controversy arose when the defendant objected to
plaintiff's motion to withdraw her jury demand. Despite 4102(a)'s
apparent prohibition of such unilateral action, the motion was granted.
The appellate division affirmed trial term's order, reasoning that the
defendant could not have been in a position to object to plaintiff's
subsequent withdrawal of her demand since, in light of the fact that
he filed his note of issue first without making a demand, it was logically
impossible for him to contend that he relied upon her demand to
safeguard his right to a jury trial. The court noted that the defendant
was in no way prejudiced because the same result would have been
achieved if the plaintiff had not subsequently demanded a jury trial.
In opposition to the majority's position, and in reliance upon two
earlier decisions,1 74 the dissent called for strict interpretation of the
statute. However, the two cases cited by the dissent are readily dis-
tinguishable in that the defendants in those cases were not first to
file the note of issue. Instead, they relied upon the plaintiffs' demands
for a jury trial.
Furthermore, the dissent's concern over the possibility that the
defendant had been forced to expend much effort and undergo great
expense in preparation for a jury trial is equally meretricious. If such
were indeed the case, the court, in its discretion, could have granted
a jury trial pursuant to subsections (d) and (e) of CPLR 4102 without
interpreting subsection (a) in the literal sense suggested by the dissent.
CPLR 4112: Proper time to request jury poll in a two-stage trial held
to be at conclusion of second stage.
The right of the nonprevailing party to poll the jury'7" after a
verdict has been rendered is deeply entrenched in the common law of
172 Id. at 351, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (emphasis added).
173 CPLR 3402(a).
174 Schnur v. Gajewski, 207 Misc. 637, 140 N.YS.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955);
Huntsberry v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
175 One object of polling the jury is to ascertain whether the jurors in fact agree with
the rendered verdict and to insure that no juror has had a change of mind before entry
of the decision in the minutes of the court. See Labor v. Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547 (1851).
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
New York.17 6 The significance attached to this right is evidenced by the
fact that the clerk will refrain from recording the jury's verdict until
the completion of the polling procedure. 77 If the jury does not agree
with the announced verdict, the court will then direct that it be recon-
sidered. 78 While the party against whom the verdict is pronounced
has the prerogative of polling the jury, this right may be waived. How-
ever, an inappropriate denial of counsel's request to poll will be
deemed reversible error, and a new trial will be granted upon appealY.79
A party should properly assert his right to have the jury polled
immediately after the verdict has been delivered; if counsel fails to
act at this time, his client's right to poll will be deemed impliedly
waived. 18 0 An implied waiver may also result from counsel's failure to
pursue the issue if it appears that he had an opportunity to assert his
right to poll after his initial request was denied.' 8 '
Recently, the Second Department found the latter principle dis-
positive of the question presented in Pickering v. Freedman,82 which
involved a two-stage trial before the same jury on the issues of liability
and damages arising from an automobile collision. Separate verdicts
were rendered; the first established the defendants' liability, and the
second, the amount of compensation awarded to the plaintiff for the
damages sustained. The trial court had denied defendants' request for
a poll of the jurors at the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, and
defendant did not renew the request at the end of the second phase.
After refuting defendants' contention that the trial court erred in
denying a poll of the jury at the conclusion of the liability phase of
the trial, the appellate court further held that the defendants' right to
poll after either phase was waived by their failure to reassert the
privilege at the conclusion of the damages phase.
Although defendants' failure appears to fall within the category
of an implied waiver of the right to poll the jury, the question of
170 Warner v. New York Cent. R.R., 52 N.Y. 437 (1873); Labor v. Koplin, 4 N.Y. 547
(1851); Fox v. Smith, 3 Cow. 28 (N.Y. 1824); Farhart v. Matuijak, 283 App. Div. 977, 130
N.Y.S.2d 611, leave to appteal denied, 284 App. Div. 817, 182 N.Y.S.2d 347 (3d Dep't 1954).
1 7 7 See 4 WK&M 4112.05 (1969).
178 The direction of reconsideration by the court is discussed in 4 WK&M 4112.07
(1969).
179 Dore v. Wyer, 1 App. Div. 2d 973, 150 N.Y.S.2d 886 (2d Dep't 1956) (failure to
grant request to poll jury reversible error even though verdict was sealed and signed by
the jurors). For a discussion of sealed verdicts see 4 WK&-M 4112.02 (1969).
180 Reed v. Cook, 103 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1951).
181 See Farhart v. Matuljak, 283 App. Div. 977, 180 N.Y.S.2d 611, leave to appeal
denied, 284 App. Div. 817, 132 N.Y.S.2d 347 (3d Dep't 1954), wherein in response to coun-
sel's request to have the jury polled, the court merely stated that the verdict was unani-
mous without denying the request. However, due to the attomy's failure to except to
this response, the right to poll was adjudged waived.
18232 App. Div. 2d 649, 300 N.Y.S.2d 742 (2d Dep't 1969).
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what constitutes an implied waiver in the case of a two-stage trial had
not been previously adjudicated and thus should have been dealt with
more extensively by the court. The polling procedure gives each juror
the opportunity to dissent from the verdict to which he had previously
agreed. A denial of this opportunity may therefore cause the verdict
to be recorded in the minutes of the court8 3 without specific confirma-
tion. In view of the procedure employed in Pickering, the damages
issue would be tried only after the liability verdict was recorded. By
denying defendants' request to have the jury polled at the conclusion
of the liability phase of the proceedings, the trial court did not give
due recognition to the possible implications of its denial. If the jury
had not confirmed the first verdict upon being polled, the question
of liability would have to have been reconsidered, no entry in the
court's records could have been made, and the need for proceeding
with the second phase of the trial would have been obviated.
Moreover, the second department failed to consider the primary
purpose of the polling procedure -to make certain that each juror
actually agrees with the pronounced verdict and that no coercion has
taken place in the jury room. 8 4 It would seem that a juror who has
been coerced into acquiescing in a verdict would be less likely to dis-
close the coercion several days after it has occurred. In addition, once
the damages phase had begun, the defendants' liability for such dam-
ages would likely have become conclusively fixed in the jurors' minds.
Accordingly, it would have been proper to confirm the liability verdict
immediately after it was rendered and not several days thereafter.
ARTICLE 52-ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth reluctantly upheld by
divided fededral court.
The recently added subdivision (1) in CPLR 320(c) provides that
"an appearance is not equivalent to personal service upon the defen-
dant . . . if jurisdiction is based solely upon a levy on defendant's
property within the state pursuant to an order of attachment."
This amendment to CPLR 320 was necessitated by the widely
criticized Seider v. Roth8 5 doctrine authorizing a New York plaintiff
183 See CPLR 4112.
184 It has been stated that the object of the poll is to "ascertain with certainty
that no one has been coerced or induced to agree to a verdict to which he does not
actually assent." Brith Trumpeldor of America, Inc. v. Bermil Sales & Serv. Co., 16 Misc.
2d 186, 174 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), modified, 17 Misc. 2d
206, 183 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. T. Ist Dep't 1959).
185 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.YS.2d 99 (1966).
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